Echo operation stranglehold. Agent Werther's secret. Who in Hitler's headquarters helped us win the Battle of Kursk. Complete rejection of surprise

Gun shooting games are a favorite pastime for boys of all ages. There is a special drive in this - to defeat enemies with well-aimed shots, resourcefulness and courage. Today, shooting games have become one of the main plots of flash games, which allows you to choose the theme of the project and the main focus of the levels to be completed.

In the first place for all gamers are shooting games with weapons in which you can walk. These stories involve real battles, where monsters, zombies, special forces enemies and other aggressive characters go against the main character. To survive in such a meat grinder, you need to do two things: walk and shoot. The weapons in such games amaze the imagination with their luxurious selection, allowing you to shoot from pistols, machine guns, grenade launchers, flamethrowers and much more.

The second block of shooting games is 2D plots. These are simple projects from a graphical point of view, intended for military operations “like in console games.” They are appreciated by many for their ease of execution, familiar interface and accessible levels. Shooting games also include strategic battles, interplanetary wars, various sieges and conquests - all those projects where you can and should shoot for the long-awaited victory.

On August 23, 1943, the grandiose battle on the Kursk Bulge ended. In a month and a half of fighting with Soviet troops, the army of the Third Reich bled to death - 500 thousand soldiers were killed and wounded, 1,500 tanks and 1,700 aircraft were destroyed. Nazi Germany never recovered from this defeat: the Germans began to retreat along the entire Eastern Front. In fact, our victory at Kursk was ensured on April 12, 1943, when Soviet intelligence put it on the table Stalin plan for the future operation "Citadel", signed by all Wehrmacht generals - himself Hitler I saw the same plan... only three days later! It was thanks to the success of the scouts that the USSR was able to prepare for the German tank offensive and crush the enemy. Meanwhile, the names of our agents surrounded by Hitler, who obtained the Citadel plan, are still (!) not declassified. Only their code names are known - Werther And Olga.

The richest spy

It is believed that the main role in the theft of documents from Berlin was played by owner of the modest Vita-Nova publishing house Rudolf Rössler. This 45-year-old German, who emigrated to Switzerland after Hitler came to power, in November 1942 himself offered his services to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the USSR General Staff, receiving the nickname Luci. Rössler handed over to the intelligence services of the Soviet Union not only the Citadel plan, but also the drawings German tank"Panther" and other valuable information. Alas, unlike most Soviet residents abroad, Rössler was not a convinced communist - he worked exclusively for money and was considered the highest paid agent in the entire history of USSR intelligence. The exact figure is unknown, but Western newspapers claimed that Rudolf received about $500 thousand for “Citadel”.

“Rössler is a very mysterious person in the history of world espionage,” says Dietrich Mainz, historical researcher from the Swiss city of Basel. - From the beginning of the German invasion of Europe, he, like tomatoes at the market, traded secrets for the intelligence services of Britain, Switzerland and the USA, and then decided to help the USSR. According to him, “only the Soviet Union is capable of winning the war.” Surprisingly, until May 1944, Soviet intelligence did not even know his real name! A participant in the First World War, he knew a large number of senior officers of the Third Reich. It is assumed that Luci had established connections in Hitler’s headquarters; about two hundred (!) agents worked for him: Werther, who supplied information about Wehrmacht operations, Olga (in the Luftwaffe command), Anna(at the Reich Foreign Ministry), Teddy And Bill.

And although Moscow repeatedly demanded to reveal the real names of the agents, Rudolf Rössler flatly refused to do so. There is an opinion that he called them the GRU of the USSR only before his death (December 11, 1958) - however, our special services do not comment on this matter. Even 70 years after the Battle of Kursk, the archives on the work of Agent Luci are still classified, and this allows us to build a huge number of assumptions: who exactly was Agent Werther, who photographed the documents of the Citadel plan and transferred them to Switzerland through Olga... and whether he was is he at all? The West German magazine Der Spiegel published an investigation in 1967, where it stated that only one informant worked for Rössler in Berlin, and he simply invented the rest in order to emphasize his importance and “extort more money from the Russians.” Writer Helmut Röwer in his book “German and Soviet Espionage in the Second World War” he called Rössler a “hoaxer”: they say that Rudolf, obsessed with the thirst for royalties, allegedly fabricated reports to Moscow and London from... ordinary newspaper clippings. But neither Spiegel nor Rover bothered to explain - where did the “hoaxer” get the drawings of the Panther tank and the secret plan for the Citadel? After all, even Colonel General Alfred Jodl, the head of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht High Command, said at the Nuremberg trials: “Stalin received documents about our offensive near Kursk much earlier than they ended up on my desk.”

Sex and exploration

— Head of the Soviet intelligence group "Dora" in Switzerland Sandor Rado At one time I was also surprised: how could Rössler receive information from Hitler’s headquarters with such speed? - says the Swiss journalist Pierre Laumier. “Later in his memoirs, he noted that it would require several couriers running around the clock between Berlin and Lucerne, and this is physically impossible.

There was no radio in Rössler's apartment, and he was not trained as a radio operator. Perhaps Werther and Olga transmitted radiograms from Berlin to their authorized representative in Switzerland, who took them to Rössler, and only then “Dora” sent the material to Moscow. The Germans, observing the work of Soviet intelligence on the German border, were furious. In 1943, they undertook a cunning maneuver: an Abwehr employee arrived in Switzerland Hans Peters- a handsome man who was called the “bed officer.” Knowing how to court women professionally, Peters quickly seduced the 23-year-old Dora radio operator Margherita Bolli. During the night of love, she told him the name of the book used for encryption - “It all began in September.” On October 13, 1943, Bolli was arrested by Swiss police, and in May 1944, the authorities detained Rudolf Rössler himself...

Germany, foaming at the mouth, demanded that the Swiss authorities urgently extradite Luci - the intelligence services of the Third Reich were eager to find out the name of agent Werther, who ensured Hitler’s defeat in the Battle of Kursk. However, Rudolf remained silent during interrogations, and by that time things at the front had become very bad for Germany. Taking this into account, the Swiss did not get involved with the USSR - a few months later Rössler was completely acquitted. Margarita Bolli received a lenient sentence - 9 months probation and a fine of 500 francs.

I spent three days trying to find Margherita Bolli in Basel, where she moved with her husband in 1956. She would now be 93 years old. It is difficult to say whether the radio operator is still alive, but there is no information in the press about her death. However, I was unable to find her address in the Basel information service - perhaps she lives under a different name. Meanwhile, Bolli is the only (except for Rudolf Rössler) member of the Dora group who knew the name and position of Werther’s agent in Berlin. I have no doubt that this man existed. But, damn it, who is he?

“This is a person from the Fuhrer’s entourage. Perhaps a friend of his family." Adolf Hitler and Eva Brown introduced by a Soviet agent? Read the continuation in the next issue of AiF.

A very pathetic order was issued by the commander of the 7th Infantry Division on July 4, 1943 about the next day: “Soldiers! It's time to attack. I know that each of you will fulfill your duty to the last. You will cover with new glory the victorious banners of the division that crushed the enemy in Poland, France and at the gates of Moscow, and then, during two years of defensive battles, repelled all attacks on Russian soil. Our fallen soldiers look at you from their graves. We salute Germany, we are devoted to her and her beloved Fuhrer."

Lieutenant General Fritz-Georg von Rappard was clear where he was sending his soldiers. His message of June 28 leaves no doubt about this: “The enemy opposing our corps expects a German offensive and has concentrated significant forces. He has exceptionally deep, well-prepared and manpower-rich positions, he has created a strong, carefully distributed anti-tank defense system and, in addition, the enemy has unusually powerful artillery and a large number of multi-barrel rocket launchers and he also has a strike reserve, in including tanks. One should expect stubborn resistance from a defensive enemy on the front line, and later also diversionary operations and counter-offensives.”

The German leadership understood perfectly well what would happen after the offensive, scheduled for 3:30 am on July 5th. From the northern direction, the 9th Army of Army Group Center, under the command of Walter Model, and from the southern direction, the 4th Panzer Army of Army Group South, under the command of Hermann Hoth, were to advance towards Kursk in order to destroy the Soviet troops dug in on the ledge of a front section 200 kilometers long and 100 kilometers deep.

Just a limited offensive operation

Even if the exact figures regarding the number of enemy forces were not known to the leadership, their order testified to the existing misconception. 625,000 German soldiers with 2,700 tanks and 1,300 aircraft were to attack an enemy three times as numerous, who had 17,000 earthworks, 30,000 artillery pieces and turned the Kursk front into the largest field fortification of all time. It is no coincidence that the intelligence department of the Foreign Armies of the East (Fremde Heere Ost) warned: “Thus, it is unlikely that the German offensive will be able to break through the defenses... On the German side, taking into account the situation as a whole, those reserves that later will be urgently needed."

In principle, it was only a matter of proving to oneself, the internal front and the enemy one’s ability to act and at the same time defeat as many Red Army formations as possible. “Operation Citadel ... should no longer be considered a strategic offensive, but a limited offensive operation within the framework of a strategic defense,” emphasizes historian Karl-Heinz Frieser, one of the best experts on the world war in the east.

Complete rejection of surprise

Although the operational deployment plans constantly emphasized the need to keep preparations for the offensive in the strictest confidence, the Soviet leadership unraveled the plans for the German operation no later than June. And German intelligence was also able to find out about this in a timely manner. Nevertheless, the Wehrmacht abandoned its biggest trump card, which until recently allowed it to achieve impressive successes during lightning operations, at least at the initial stage - that is, surprise. The enemy is “fully prepared for defense,” emphasized the order quoted at the outset, which, along with other documents of the 7th Infantry Division, can be consulted in the Military Archives of the Federal Archives in Freiburg.

This formation included the 9th Army, which was supposed to move from the north towards Kursk. The Red Army's positions were 30 kilometers deep and consisted of trenches as well as other field-type fortifications. Only once on the first day of the offensive was it possible to make a breakthrough to a depth of eight kilometers. Already on July 6, one day after the start of the operation, an order was received for a “temporary transition to defense.”