Karl gross games special features. Game theory by K. Gross. Historical origins of gaming activities

The phenomenon of play has long attracted the attention of philosophers, sociologists, psychologists, ethnographers, biologists, educators, and cultural experts; the game is studied in control theory and other sciences.
Plato spoke about the playful cosmos, I. Kant - about the aesthetics of the “state of play.”
The beginning of the development of general game theory is associated with the works of F. Schiller and G. Spencer.
The German poet, playwright and art theorist of the Enlightenment, Johann Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805), viewed play as an important characteristic of human behavior. He, following Kant, highlighted the aesthetic nature of play and saw in it the main characteristic of man in general. He defined play as pleasure associated with the manifestation of excess strength, free from external needs. I. F. Schiller emphasized that “Man<.. .>He is fully human only when he plays.”
The English philosopher and sociologist Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) brought a revolutionary approach to the understanding of play, pointing out the spread of play among higher animals. The game performs the function of exercise in a person’s life.
F. Nietzsche attached particular importance to play, as an important condition for the formation and formation of human nature.
Since the end of the 19th century, the game has become an object of scientific interest. The first attempt to systematically study the game was made by the Swiss-German scientist K. Gross. Following G. Spencer, he considered play to be inherent in higher species of animals and believed that it stems from the need in both animals and children to exercise and develop hereditary forms of behavior. The game serves to preliminary adapt instincts to conditions future life.
Children's play, which arises in the process of historical development of society, consists of children reproducing the actions and relationships of adults. In the individual development of a child, play becomes the leading activity in preschool age, it is in connection with its development that the most important changes are made in the child’s psyche, and preparation for the transition to a new stage of development occurs. K. Gross considered children's games as the primary form of a person’s involvement in society (voluntary submission general rules and leader, fostering collectivism and a sense of responsibility for one’s group (team), developing the ability to communicate and interact).
He devoted two monographs to this problem - “Animal Games” (1896) and “Human Games” (1899).
Freudians see play as an expression of deep instincts, or drives.
The German psychologist K. Bühler believed that the game can only be supported by positive emotions (you cannot play “under pressure”) generated by the game process itself, and defined the game as an activity that is performed for the sake of obtaining “functional pleasure.”
The Russian Marxist philosopher G.V. Plekhanov (1856-1918) considered play an important type of human activity that satisfies the needs of society for the activation and education of children. Considering the role and function of play in human life and polemicizing on the problem of the relationship between work and play with such prominent scientists as G. Spencer, K. Bühler and K. Gross, he noted that play is akin to art, since the plot of reproducing life in the game is one one of the main features of art.
Canadian-American psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Eric Berne (1910-1970), author of the books “Games People Play” and “People Who Play Games,” which became an international bestseller, believed that almost all human relationships can be described as conventional games.
The German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) believed that a game does not represent a serious situation for the player.
The theory of the game, based on its social nature, was developed by domestic psychologists of the second half of the twentieth century E. A. Arkin, L. S. Vygotsky, A. N. Leontiev and others. They saw in the game a factor in nurturing collectivism. Linking play with indicative activity, D. B. Elkonin defines play as an activity in which behavior control is developed and improved.
Some cultural historians, for example V. Vsevolodov-Gengross, considered human play as a type of social practice, consisting in the reproduction of life phenomena outside of a real practical setting. The social significance of the game at different stages of development of society was associated with its collectivizing and training role. It was also noted that in the course of history, dramatic art and sports gradually began to play this role.
The role is important in the game. It is the key unit of the game, its central point, uniting all its aspects. The game is forming arbitrary behavior child, his socialization. But adults also play games.
The game can be individual (“theater for oneself”) and collective.
A characteristic feature of the game is its two-dimensionality, which is also inherent in dramatic art, the elements of which are preserved in any collective game. On the one hand, the player performs a real activity, the implementation of which requires actions related to the solution of very specific, often non-standard tasks, on the other hand, a number of aspects of this activity are conditional in nature, allowing one to escape from the real situation with its responsibility and numerous incidental circumstances.
The two-dimensionality determines the developmental effect of the game.
Sociologists see games as a way of human self-expression. In the chosen game, a person can always achieve mastery, success and recognition, become a leader, which is not always possible in real life(at work, in the family). The game allows you to gain self-satisfaction and increase self-esteem.

The play of animals and humans has long been of interest to philosophers, teachers and psychologists, but it became the subject of special psychological research only at the end of the 19th century. in K. Groos. Before Groos, the Italian scientist D. A. Colozza made an attempt to systematize materials about children's games. His book contains an attempt to reveal the psychological and pedagogical significance children's game. This is precisely why the result of the psychological part of the book is the classification of games according to mental processes, which are most clearly represented in certain games and which, according to the author, are exercised in these games.

Colozza has thoughts that anticipate the future theory of Groos, as A. Grombach rightly points out in the preface to the Russian edition of D. A. Colozza’s book “Children’s Games, Their Psychological and Pedagogical Significance” (1909). “In higher animals,” writes Colozza, “including humans, the struggle for existence at first is not particularly difficult and cruel. Newborns find help, protection and care from their mother or, as happens in most cases, from their father and mother. Their lives are largely supported by the labor and activities of those who brought them into the world; their strength, which does not have to be used to obtain food, is spent freely in such a way that this expenditure cannot be considered labor.

We see the same thing to an even greater extent in the lives of people, especially in civilized societies. The family reaches its highest development here. Parents are forced to devote most of their labor to providing food, and children need several years not to be able to live independently, but just to prepare for work that does not initially require the full use of their strength. Even when a child begins to work, his existence is largely supported by his loved ones. Therefore, he always has a surplus of energy, which he spends on playing or thanks to which he indulges, as Spencer says in his Sociology, in that accepted exercise of his inactive abilities, which is called play” (1909, p. 31).

Elsewhere, describing the play of domestic cats, Colozza writes: “Very soon they (kittens) develop an interest in everything that rolls, runs, crawls and flies. This is a preparatory stage for future hunting of mice and birds” (ibid., p. 27). It was this idea about the game as an anticipation of future serious activities, expressed by Colozza, and before him expressed by G. Spencer, that was used by K. Groos as the basis for his theory of the game.

The game theory of K. Groos is quite well known and was widespread in the first quarter of the 20th century. Giving her the most general characteristics, Groos calls it the theory of exercise or self-education. K. Groos defines the main ideas of the “theory of exercise” in the following provisions:

1) each Living being has inherited predispositions that give expediency to his behavior; Among the highest animals, the innate characteristics of their organic nature include an impulsive desire for activity, which manifests itself with particular force during the period of growth...

2) in higher living beings, especially in humans, innate reactions, no matter how necessary they may be, are insufficient to perform complex life tasks;

3) in the life of every higher being there is childhood, that is, a period of development and growth when it cannot independently support its life; this opportunity is given to him with the help of parental care, which, in turn, is based on innate predispositions;

4) this time of childhood aims to make possible the acquisition of adaptations necessary for life, but not developing directly from innate reactions; therefore, a person is given a particularly long childhood - after all, the more perfect the work, the longer the preparation for it;

5) the development of adaptations possible due to childhood can be of various kinds. A particularly important and at the same time the most natural way of developing them is that the inherited reactions in connection with the mentioned impulsive need for activity themselves strive for manifestation and thus themselves give rise to new acquisitions, so that acquired skills are formed above the innate basis - and first just new habitual reactions;

6) this type of development of adaptations is brought into close connection with the habits and abilities of the older generation, with the help of the innate human desire to imitate;

7) where the developing individual in the indicated form, from his own internal motivation and without any external goal, manifests, strengthens and develops his inclinations, there we are dealing with the most original phenomena of play” (1916, pp. 70-71).

Summarizing his reasoning about the meaning of play, Groos writes: “If the development of adaptations for further life tasks is the main goal of our childhood, then a prominent place in this purposeful connection of phenomena belongs to play, so that we can well say, using a somewhat paradoxical form, that we play not because we are children, but this is precisely why childhood is given to us, so that we can play” (ibid., p. 72).

Although a wide variety of amendments and additions were made to the game theory of K. Groos, in general it was accepted by E. Claparède (in his early works), R. Gaupp, W. Stern, K. Bühler, and among Russian psychologists - N.D. Vinogradov, V.P. Vakhterov and others.

There was almost not a single author who wrote about the game who did not try to make his own adjustments or additions to the theory of K. Groos. The history of work on the creation of a general theory of the game before the publication of F. Buytendijk’s book (F. Buytendijk, 1933) (except for the theory of S. Freud) was a history of amendments, additions and individual critical comments to the theory of K. Groos associated with general views on the process mental development child.

Let us dwell on the critical remarks to the game theory of K. Groos.

E. Claparede, in his article (E. Claparede, 1934) dedicated to Buytendijk’s book, wrote: at the beginning of the 20th century. psychologists imagined that they had the key to the riddle of the game, which K. Groos had put into their hands, while he only made them aware of the riddle itself. Since then, the question of the game seems even more complex than before.

One cannot but agree with this assessment of the role of K. Groos's works on the game. K. Groos, of course, did not solve the riddle of the game; this riddle has not been completely solved even today. But Groos's greatest merit is that he raised the problem of play and, with his theory of prevention, put it in the category of those activities that are essential for all development in childhood. No matter how we feel about Groos’ theory, no matter how controversial it may seem to us now, his theory contains a position about the importance of play for mental development, and this position must be maintained by us, although significantly updated. K. Groos, in fact, did not create a theory of play as an activity typical of childhood, but only pointed out that this activity has a specific, biologically important function. K. Groos's theory talks about the meaning of the game, but says nothing about the nature of the game itself.

V.V. Zenkovsky, in the preface to the Russian edition of K. Groos’s book “The Mental Life of a Child,” wrote: “As deep and valuable as the biological concept of children’s games developed by Groos is, we must admit that Groos’s psychological analysis of them is sometimes weak and superficial. Indeed, the central importance of games in a child’s life can be maintained only if, in addition to general reasoning, the dependence on games of the child’s entire mental development can be revealed. The biological theory of play can be maintained if only it is possible to show the psychological connection of play with all the processes occurring in the child’s soul, if it is possible to make the psychology of play the starting point for explaining the child’s psyche. Not only do we not find this in Groos, but when reading his book one involuntarily gets the impression that he does not even suspect the full complexity of the problems arising here” (1916, p. VI). “Having made a number of valuable comments on the psychology of play, Groos does not place play at the center of mental development, as his own theory requires” (ibid.).

K. Groos simply states that the game has the nature of a warning, and in this he sees its biological meaning; his evidence for this basic thesis boils down to analogies between the playful forms of behavior of young animals and the corresponding forms of serious activity of adult animals. When K. Groos sees a kitten playing with a ball, only because its movements resemble those of an adult cat hunting for a mouse, he classifies this game as “hunting games” and considers them warnings. He poses not the question of what kind of behavior this is, what its psychological mechanism is, but the question of what is the biological meaning of such “frivolous” behavior. Is his answer to this question conclusive? I think not. The proof by analogy in this case does not stand up to criticism.

Let us, however, move on to an analysis of the main provisions of K. Groos on the merits.

The basic premise from which Groos proceeds can be considered correct. Indeed, at a certain stage of the phylogenetic development of animals, species experience, rigidly fixed in various kinds of hereditary forms of behavior, turns out to be insufficient for adaptation to more complex and, most importantly, constantly changing conditions of existence. There is a need for individual experience that develops in the course of individual life. Groos is also right that this individual experience, these new adaptations cannot arise directly from innate reactions. Play, from Groos’s point of view, is the activity in which the formation of the necessary superstructure over innate reactions occurs, “form-. all acquired skills - and above all new habitual reactions.”

However, there are at least two controversial points in these provisions of Groos. Firstly, although he believes that individual experience arises on the basis of a specific, hereditarily fixed experience, he contrasts these two forms of adaptation. Such a contrast does not reflect their real connection. “The formation of individual experience,” A. N. Leontiev rightly points out, “consists in the adaptation of species behavior to the changing elements of the external environment” (1965, p. 296). Consequently, nothing is built on top of the species behavior, but simply the species behavior itself changes and becomes more flexible.

Secondly, it is difficult to imagine that in the play of animals - an activity not related to the struggle for existence and, therefore, taking place in special conditions, not at all similar to those in which, for example, the real hunting of an animal would take place - real adaptations arose. It lacks the main thing - real reinforcement, without which, as was known already in the time of Groos, the emergence and fixation of new specific forms of species experience is impossible. How can even the smallest change in species experience occur if the basic needs of the young are satisfied by the adults and the young do not even enter into a real relationship with the conditions of their future life? Of course, no new forms of species experience can arise in the game.

Let us return, however, to Groos. The fallacy of the logic of Groos's reasoning lies in the fact that, having approached the game teleologically, attributing to it a certain biological meaning, he began to look for it in the games of animals, without revealing their actual nature, without even comparing play behavior with the utilitarian, without analyzing the game on its merits.

K. Groos also makes a grave mistake in that he transfers directly, without any reservations, the biological meaning of play from animals to humans. K. Groos argues a lot with G. Spencer. He argues with his theory of “excess strength,” although he accepts in the end, with certain amendments: he objects to the role of imitation, which G. Spencer pointed out, and believes that there can be no talk of any imitation in animals. However, arguing with Spencer on certain private issues, he remains a Spencerian in his principled approach to the problems of human psychology in general, to the issues of child play in particular. The essence of this approach, which can be called positivist evolutionism, is that during the transition to man, despite the extreme difference in human living conditions from the life of animals and the emergence of, in addition to natural ones, social conditions, the emergence of labor, laws and mechanisms of adaptation, in particular the mechanisms of acquiring individual experience, do not fundamentally change.Such a naturalistic approach to human (child) play is false. K. Groos, as well as a number of psychologists who take the position of Spencerian positivism, do not see the fact that became obvious after the works of K. Marx that the transition to man fundamentally implicates the process of individual development.

K. Groos in his theory of play guessed (didn’t understand, but guessed) that play is important for development. This conjecture of Groos, as we have already said, must be retained in any new theory of play, although the very understanding of the function of play in development must be revised.

The question posed by Groos can be reformulated as follows: what new does the game introduce into the species behavior of animals, or what new aspect of the species behavior does the game build; What is the psychological content of the warnings? It is this question that serves as the subject of all further research into animal play.

After K. Groos published works on the game, his theory became dominant and was recognized by all or almost all psychologists. It implemented the general fundamental positions held by psychologists of that time and which were described above as the positions of Spencerian positivism. However, accepting the theory of K. Groos as a whole, some psychologists made their own additions and amendments to it, adapting it to their views.

Thus, V. Stern places Groos’s work very highly and includes his concept of play in his personalistic system of views: “From the point of view of biological or, better said, teleological research, play is a necessary member in the system of personality goals (emphasis added - D. E. .). Here its definition reads: play is the instinctive self-formation of developing inclinations, the unconscious preliminary exercise of future serious functions” (1922, p. 167). Elsewhere, V. Stern writes that play is to life as maneuvers are to war. The need for play as a warning Stern derives from the premature occurrence of internal dispositions.

According to V. Stern, various human abilities and skills are “required for service,” that is, they become vital, in different times. But it turns out that the internal dispositions that lead to these skills are not at all consistent in their mental awakening with this period of actual need, but are felt much earlier. This prematureness seems to be a general law; no mental function is free from its action. With instinctive self-implication, directions of activity are suddenly established that are not yet intended for a person’s real life, but often, with their truly spontaneous energy, show what goal a person is striving for. This is the activity of the game. In the floundering and babbling of an infant, play, the instincts of walking and speaking, which will be needed in practice only a year later, are already manifested; in the wild games of a boy, in the play of a girl with dolls, the instincts of struggle and care are already evident, the use of which will be required only decades later, etc. d. Every tendency in play is the dawn of a serious instinct.

In view of the universality of these premature manifestations of instinct, we have the right to see in them a homogeneous internal disposition of a person, that is, to speak of the “impulse to play” (“Spieltrieb”, according to Schiller) or the “instinct of play.” As with other instincts, the individual here experiences an irresistible internal desire, to which he surrenders without asking “why” and “for what” (see: V. Stern, 1922, pp. 168-169).

As is clear from the above provisions, Stern, sharing the views of Groos, makes some additions to them. There are three of these additions: the first is the idea of ​​the premature maturation of abilities; the second is the recognition of play as a special instinct; the third is the need for the preparation of maturing abilities to intimately contact them with the impressions of the outside world.

As for the first addition, it does not contradict Groos’ theory, but only introduces a new explanatory principle into it. The second addition is in direct conflict with the views of the author of the prevention theory. K. Groos in his book “The Mental Life of a Child” specially emphasizes:

“In my presentation, I never spoke about the “drive to play” or the “instinct of play.” And indeed, I do not consider it possible to admit their existence. Therefore, I emphatically emphasized in my “SpielederTiere” (S. 86) that there is no general “attraction to play” and that the game, on the contrary, is itself only a peculiar way of manifesting various instincts and drives. Despite this, thanks to the erroneous understanding of this point in my first work, the opinion became widespread that the basis of the theory of exercise was the recognition of the instinct of play” (1916, p. 73).

The most significant is the third addition made by V. Stern. V. Stern points out that the child, even when he imitates, does not passively follow the model, so that the game is determined solely by him. “On the contrary,” writes Stern, “here we have a typical example of the convergence of the innate and the adopted: the external factor of the environment provides exclusively possible materials and models for games, what serves to imitate (Imitablia), but only the internal factor of the instinct of play determines when and how actual imitations (Imitatio) will emerge from them. The unconscious choice between materials to imitate, the method of their assimilation and processing depend entirely on innate dispositions: on the internal conditions of development and those of differentiation” (1922, p. 172).

K. Groos, unlike V. Stern, does not raise the question of the role of external conditions in the game at all, since he is a principled opponent of G. Spencer’s position on imitation as the basis of the game. V. Stern, referring mainly to the human child, points to the role of imitation. It would seem that these same external conditions, which are the source of role models, will be given a decisive role. However, V. Stern minimizes the importance of living conditions. It would seem that imitation should serve to connect the child with the living conditions around him, in particular with mature forms of activity of adults, in the environment in which the child grows and develops. V. Stern, with his theory of convergence, removes this progressive role of imitation and puts it at the service of internal tendencies - instincts. This idea brings the positions of V. Stern closer to the positions of biogeneticists (S. Hall and others), for whom the content of children's games is determined by the automatically advancing stages, repeating the stages of the historical development of mankind.

Thus, this amendment by V. Stern not only does not advance K. Groos’s theory of play, but, on the contrary, deepens its erroneous aspects associated with a misunderstanding of the fundamental difference between the development of children and the development of young animals.

The amendments and additions made to the game theory of K. Groos by the Viennese psychologist K. Bühler go in a slightly different direction.

K. Bühler accepts K. Groos' theory of prevention. Thus, he writes: “For animals that are highly capable of training, animals with “plastic” abilities, nature has provided a period of development during which they are more or less subject to the protection and example of parents and peers in preparation for real, serious life. This time is called youth, and youthful play is closely connected with it. Young dogs and cats and human children play, but beetles and insects, even highly organized bees and ants, do not play. This cannot be an accident, but rests on an internal connection: play is a complement to plastic abilities and together they constitute the equivalent of instinct. The game provides the long-term exercise necessary for still immature, unstable abilities, or, more accurately, it itself represents these exercises” (1924, p. 23).

Highly appreciating the theory of K. Groos, K. Bühler attributes the emergence of play in phylogenesis as a warning to the stage of training. At the same time, K. Bühler believes that the theory of K. Groos, while pointing to the objective side of the game, does not explain it, since it leaves its subjective side undisclosed. In revealing this, from the point of view of K. Bühler, the most important aspect of the game, he proceeds from his theory of the primacy of hedonological reactions1.

Accepting in general the theory of S. Freud2, his principle of striving for pleasure as the basic principle of life, K. Bühler at the same time polemicizes with him. He reproaches S. Freud for the fact that the latter knows only pleasure, which cannot be the driving force of development and new acquisitions. K. Bühler considers Freud's explanation of the game to be inconsistent with the facts and reproaches him for the fact that his explanation directs the game into the child's past life, and not towards the future. In this regard, he contrasts Groos, who sees great potential for life in children's play, with Freud, who is a theorist of reproduction (see: K. Buhler, 1933, p. 206).

To explain the game, K. Bühler introduces the concept of functional pleasure. This concept gains its definition when it is distinguished, on the one hand, from pleasure-enjoyment, and on the other, from the joy associated with anticipating the result of an activity.

Critically assessing the theory of excess strength of G. Spencer, K. Bühler writes: “No, nature followed the direct path; for the training mechanism she needed a surplus, a wasteful wealth of activities, body movements, especially in young animals that must prepare and exercise for a serious life , and for this purpose she endowed the activity itself with pleasure, she created a mechanism for the pleasure of functioning. Activity as such, the proportionate, smooth, frictionless functioning of the organs of the body, regardless of any result achieved by the activity, turned into a source of joy. At the same time, the engine of tireless trial and error was acquired” (1924, pp. 504-505).

K. Bühler believes that functional pleasure could appear for the first time at the stages of the emergence of skills and, as a biological mechanism of play, became a vital factor of the first category. Based on this, K. Bühler gives his definition of play: “An activity that is equipped with functional pleasure and is directly supported by it or for the sake of it, we will call a game, regardless of what it also does and in what purposeful connection it stands” (ibid., p. 508).

Since in K. Bühler's concept the central point of play is functional pleasure, it is first necessary to evaluate its actual meaning. Let us assume that K. Bühler is right and that there really is pleasure in activity as such. Such functional pleasure acts as a motive, that is, as something for the sake of which an activity is performed, and at the same time as an internal mechanism that supports its repetition. Training involves repetition in order to consolidate such new forms of behavior (skills) that are necessary for better adaptation to changing living conditions. Functional pleasure is the mechanism underlying the recall and repetition of certain movements. Such repetition ultimately leads to the consolidation of these repeated forms of behavior.

Could functional pleasure, however, underlie the selection of behavioral forms? Let us also accept the second position of K. Bühler, that for the selection of forms of behavior there is a need for their surplus, a wasteful wealth of activities, body movements, especially in young animals. What of this wealth should be selected and then secured?

If we consider the acquisition of new forms of behavior through the mechanism of trial and error, then the very name of this method contains the possibility of selection: successful actions are selected, repeated and reinforced, while erroneous actions are inhibited, are not repeated, and are not reinforced. But functional pleasure is the engine of all trials, including erroneous ones. Therefore, functional pleasure, in best case scenario, should lead to repetition, and therefore, consolidation of any activities, any movements. Experimental studies of learning conducted by American psychologists, data on the formation of conditioned reflexes from the school of I.P. Pavlov, and finally, practical training experience indicate that selection is of decisive importance in the formation of new adaptations, and this latter is associated with reinforcement, i.e. with satisfaction of need.

Thus, the reinforcement of a need is decisive for the selection of those activities that can lead to its satisfaction. Functional pleasure causes and reinforces movement in itself, regardless of it. adaptive function. K. Bühler reproached S. Freud for being a theorist of reproduction, but K. Bühler himself, introducing pleasure from functioning, does not go beyond the limits of reproduction, but even more affirms it.

K. Koffka pointed out the insufficiency of K. Bühler’s theory:

“Bühler offers a new point of view. He argues that any activity in itself, regardless of its result, brings pleasure. I must add - successful activity, that is, activity that proceeds correctly, according to my desire, brings pleasure regardless of whether the goal achieved is joyful or not. We have already encountered such examples: I will remind you of Sultan in the experiment with a double stick and his joy at the first meaningful actions3. Bühler considers this “joy” from the function as an incentive to give oneself completely play activity. I see in this an important shift that needs to be formalized, of course, in theory, because the transition from pleasure to activity is by no means easy to understand. But it is quite clear that pleasure from one’s own action serves as an incentive to new actions” (1934, p. 235).

Koffka's criticisms are fair, but not sufficient. Firstly, he understands the success of his activity subjectively; secondly, pleasure from one’s own action can serve as an incentive not to new actions, but to repeat old ones.

Thus, K. Bühler’s assumption that functional pleasure is a force that leads to new adaptations at the training stage is unjustified. K. Bühler’s assumption that play is a universal form of training is also not justified. Training differs from exercise in that it involves the selection and formation of new devices, while exercise involves the repetition and improvement of what has already been selected. Since the game, according to K. Bühler’s definition, is independent of any result and, therefore, is not associated with a real adaptation, it cannot contain the selection of adaptations that are subject to subsequent exercise.

Our consideration of K. Bühler's theory would be incomplete if we did not mention the second side of the game indicated by K. Bühler. In addition to functional pleasure, he notes the principle of form that governs play, or the desire for perfect form. Formulating this second principle, K. Bühler refers to the works of S. Bühler, G. Getzer and other psychologists of the Viennese school. This principle is most fully presented in the works of S. Bühler.

S. Bühler, pointing out that K. Bühler complements the theory of K. Groos with two provisions (specific functional pleasure and the importance of formal success); clarifies his thought and says that formation, which represents mastery and improvement, brings with it pleasure, and functional pleasure must be understood as associated not with repetition as such, but with the formation and improvement of movement progressing with each repetition. Hence, Ch. Buhler defines play as an activity aimed at the pleasure of improvement (Ch. Buhler, 1931, p. 56). With this understanding of the game, it is natural that S. Bühler considers the functional, manipulative games of the youngest children to be pure games.

What new does this thesis about the original desire for improvement with which functional pleasure is supposedly associated? It does not resolve, but confuses the issue even more. Having separated the formal achievements of exercises from the material success of the activity, K. Bühler, and after him S. Bühler, introducing the concept of the initial striving for a perfect form, did not indicate what the criteria for improvement are that an animal or a child uses when moving from one repetition to another. Such criteria, of course, do not exist and cannot exist where there is no model and no attitude towards it as a model. If Groos gave a teleological explanation of the game as a whole, then K. and S. Bühler take this teleologism to its logical end, seeing an internal goal in each individual repetition. Trying to supplement and correct Groos' theory with an analysis of the subjective aspects of the game, K. Bühler actually only deepened Groos' teleologism.

K. Bühler's theory leaves no room for a natural scientific explanation of play, for understanding play as an activity of an animal that connects it with reality, attempts at which, although in a minimal form, were contained in G. Spencer and partly in K. Groos. Teleology finally replaces biology in explaining the game.

Until the appearance of the work of F. Buytendijk (1933), the theory of K. Groos remained dominant. F. Buytendijk presented a new, original attempt to create a general theory of the game.

Describing the relationship between Buytendijk's theory and Groos's theory, Klaparede (1934) wrote that the concept of the preparatory meaning of play was overcome by Buytendijk in his work on the nature and meaning of play, rich in ideas (richer in ideas than in observations) and illustrated with very beautiful photographs. playing children and animals.

First of all, let us indicate Buytendijk’s two main objections to K. Groos’s theory of prevention. First, Buytendijk argues that there is no evidence that an animal that has never played has less perfect instincts. Exercise, according to Buytendijk, does not have the significance for the development of instinctive activity that is attributed to it. Psychomotor activity, according to Buytendijk, does not need to be “lost” in order to be ready to function, just as a flower does not need play in order to germinate.

Thus, the first objection is that instinctive forms of activity, as well as the neural mechanisms underlying them, mature independently of exercise. In this objection, Buytendijk advocates the theory of maturation under the influence of potential internal forces.

Secondly, Buytendijk separates the acting exercise itself, pointing out that such preparatory exercises exist, but when they are such, they are not a game. To prove this point, F. Buytendijk gives a number of examples.

When a child learns to walk or run, this walking, although imperfect, is real. It is completely different when a child who can walk plays walking. When a little fox or another animal goes hunting with its parents in order to practice this, the activity is not of a playful nature and is completely different from games of hunting, chasing, etc. of the same animals. In the first case, the animal kills its prey, in another, he behaves in a completely harmless manner. Buytendijk's attempt to distinguish an exercise in future serious activity from a game should be considered worthy of attention.

Buytendijk builds his theory of the game on the basis of principles opposite to the provisions of K. Groos. If for K. Groos the game explains the meaning of childhood, then for Buytendijk, on the contrary, childhood explains the game: the creature plays because it is still young.

Buytendijk deduces and connects the peculiarities of the game, firstly, with the peculiarities of the dynamics of behavior in childhood, secondly, with the peculiarities of the relationship of this type of animal with the conditions of its life, and thirdly, with the basic drives of life.

Analyzing the dynamics of behavior characteristic of childhood, Buytendijk reduces it to four main features:

A) non-directionality (Unberichtetheit) of movements;

B) motor impulsiveness (Bewegungstrang), which consists in the fact that a child, like a young animal, is constantly in motion, which is the effect of spontaneous impulsiveness that had internal sources. From this impulsiveness grows the inconstancy characteristic of childhood behavior;

C) a “pathetic” attitude towards reality (pathischeEinstellung). By “pathetic” Buytendijk means an attitude that is the opposite of the gnostic and which can be characterized as a directly affective connection with the surrounding world, arising as a reaction to the novelty of the picture of the world that opens up before a young animal or child. With a “pathetic” attitude, Buytendijk associates absent-mindedness, suggestibility, a tendency to imitate and naivety, which characterize childishness;

D) finally, the dynamics of behavior in childhood in relation to the environment are characterized by timidity, timidity, shyness (Schuchternheit). This is not fear, for, on the contrary, children are fearless, but a special ambivalent attitude, consisting of movement towards and away from a thing, in advance and retreat. This ambivalent attitude lasts until the unity of the organism and the environment arises.

All these traits - lack of direction, motor impulsiveness, pathetic attitude towards reality and timidity - under certain conditions lead a young animal and a child to play.

However, by themselves, outside of certain conditions, these traits do not characterize gaming behavior. To analyze the conditions under which play occurs, Buytendijk analyzes play in animals. In doing so, he proceeds from an analysis of the environment in which the animal lives and to which it must adapt.

According to Buytendijk, depending on the nature of the living conditions of higher animals, mammals can be divided into two large groups: herbivores and carnivores. The latter are natural hunters. These latest game is particularly widespread. Herbivorous mammals play very little or not at all. Distinctive feature The relationship between hunting animals and the environment is their installation on formalized physical objects that are clearly differentiated in the hunting field. An exception to the herbivores are monkeys, which, unlike other herbivores, live in a differentiated and diverse environment. What they have in common with hunting animals is that their method of obtaining food is by grasping pre-selected objects. Buytendijk calls “hunters” and monkeys animals that “get closer to things” (Ding-Annaherungstiere).

An analysis of the prevalence of play among mammals leads Buytendijk to the conclusion that playing animals are precisely these “getting close to things” animals. The results of this analysis lead Buytendijk to the first distinction between play and other activities: “A game is always a game with something.” From this he concludes that the so-called motor games of animals (Groos) in most cases are not games. Considering the question of the relationship between pleasure and play, on the one hand, and motor impulsiveness and play, on the other, Buytendijk emphasizes, firstly, that there is no reason to call all actions accompanied by pleasure a game, and secondly, movement is not yet a game. A game is always a game with something, and not just a movement accompanied by pleasure. However, Buytendijk states, only those things that also “play” with the player can be objects of play. That is why the ball is one of the favorite objects of the game.

Buytendijk criticizes the idea of ​​play as a manifestation of instincts and believes that the basis of play is not individual instincts, but more general drives. In this matter, Buytendijk was greatly influenced by Freud's general theory of drives. Following S. Freud, he points to three initial drives leading to play:

A) the desire for liberation (Befreiungstrieb), which expresses the desire of a living being to remove the obstacles emanating from the environment that fetter freedom. Play satisfies this tendency towards individual autonomy, which, according to Buytendijk, already takes place in the newborn;

B) the desire for fusion, for community with the environment (Verein-igungstrieb). This attraction is the opposite of the first.

Together, both of these tendencies express the deep ambivalence of the game;

B) finally, there is the tendency towards repetition (Wiederholungstrieb), which Buytendijk considers in connection with the tension-resolution dynamics so essential to play.

According to Buytendijk, play arises when these initial drives collide with things that are partially familiar due to the dynamics of the young animal.

As he develops his thoughts, Buytendijk makes a number of specific comments that are of interest and should be taken into account when considering his theoretical concept. The most interesting is his idea that they play only with objects that themselves “play” with the player. Buytendijk points out that familiar objects are just as unsuitable for play as completely unfamiliar ones. The game item must be partially familiar and at the same time have unknown capabilities. In the animal world, these capabilities are mainly of a motor nature. They are discovered through experimental movements, and when the latter lead to success, then the conditions for play are created.

The peculiar relationship between familiarity and unfamiliarity in a game object creates what Buytendijk calls the image or imagery of the object. He emphasizes that both animals and humans play only with images. An object can only be a game object when it contains the possibility of imagery. The sphere of play is the sphere of images, and in connection with this the sphere of possibilities and imagination. Therefore, clarifying your definition game item, Buytendijk points out that they play only with images that themselves play with the player. The sphere of play is the sphere of images, possibilities, the directly affective (Pathischen) and the “gnostic-neutral”, partly unfamiliar and life fantasy. In the transition from play to reality, the object loses its imagery and its symbolic meaning.

Of course, the idea that animals have imaginative fantasy is a tribute to anthropomorphism.

Buytendijk's book, his theory of the game, did not go unnoticed. Of all the responses to this book, we will focus on only two.

K. Groos, against whose theory Buytendijk's work was in a certain sense directed, dedicated an article to it (K. Groos, 1934). He is forced to note first of all the wealth of thoughts contained in the book. However, K. Groos does not agree with some of Buytendijk's basic provisions. K. Groos does not agree that the main features of play are lack of direction and the desire to move. The concept of non-directionality, according to Groos, is very polysemantic and can claim to be everything. general meaning to understand the meaning of the game only if it is complemented by a possible focus on a goal that lies outside the scope of the game itself. The desire to move can also be accepted as a universal sign if we add to it the intention to move, and not just the movements actually produced.

K. Groos also disagrees with Buytendijk’s reduction of all specific forms of animal play, in which various instincts are revealed, to two basic drives (the drive for liberation and the drive for fusion). Naturally, K. Groos does not agree with all the objections to the theory of prevention and shows the unconvincingness of Buytendijk’s arguments using the example of motor games, which, according to Buytendijk, have no exercise value.

K. Groos agrees in principle that the “imagery” of an object is an essential feature of play and that play is a sphere of possibilities for imagination, although he objects to the excessive opposition of image and thing.

A rather large article, in which not only criticism of Buytendijk’s concept was given, but also his own views was developed, was published by E. Claparède (1934).

E. Claparède's objections boil down to the following:

A) the dynamics of a young organism cannot be the basis for play for the following reasons: firstly, because they are characteristic not only of the cubs of those animals that play, but also of the cubs of those animals that do not play; secondly, because dynamics manifest themselves not only in games, but also in those forms of behavior that Buytendijk does not classify as games (for example, jumping, dancing, sports); thirdly, adults have games, although by definition they are not characterized by such dynamics; finally, these features are most openly manifested in such activities as fun, idleness, playful behavior and games of very young children, which, according to Buytendijk’s definition, are not games in the proper sense of the word;

B) Buytendijk overly limits the concept of play. Round dances and somersaults, which children indulge in in the meadow, do not belong to them as games, although precisely these activities are characterized by the features of children's dynamics indicated by him (confusion, aimlessness, rhythm, repetition). However, according to Buytendijk, these are not games, since they do not involve activities with any things;

C) the term “image” is unfortunate to denote the fictitious or symbolic meaning that the player brings to the subject of his game.

E. Claparède believes that Buytendijk's work is more valuable in its critical part than in its constructive part, and from it it is clear that we do not yet have a complete theory of the game. Buytendijk does not give a satisfactory answer to the question about the nature of the phenomenon of play because he chooses the wrong path - the path of characterizing the external form of behavior.

According to Claparède, the essence of the game is not in the external form of behavior, which can be exactly the same both in the game and not in the game, but in internally subject to reality. Claparède considers fiction to be the most essential feature of the game. Real behavior is transformed into playful behavior under the influence of fiction.

Let us now consider the concept put forward by Buytendijk on its merits and try to separate the important from the controversial in it. When analyzing Buytendijk's views, the influence that S. Freud had on him with his theory of drives is clearly visible. Play, according to Buytendijk, is an expression of the life of drives in specific conditions characteristic of childhood. Buytendijk emphasizes this in the subtitle of his book:

“Human and animal games as a form of manifestation of life’s drives.” (It is not surprising that E. Claparède did not pay attention to this core of Buytendijk’s game theory. This happened because Claparède is also not alien to the views of S. Freud.)

Buytendijk borrows the characteristics of the basic drives manifested in play from the works of Freud and transfers them to animals. There are sufficient reasons for this, since, according to Freud, primordial drives are inherent even in single-celled organisms. However, this position is unconvincing, since drives are characteristic not only of a young organism, but also of grown individuals. And therefore, just like the dynamics of a young organism, they cannot determine play or lead to play activity.

If we translate Buytendijk's somewhat vague and mystifying language into simpler language, it turns out that play in its original form is nothing more than a manifestation of orienting activity. Buytendijk's position that they play only with things that “play” with the player himself can be understood as follows: they play only with objects that not only cause an indicative reaction, but also contain enough elements of possible novelty to support indicative activity. Significant in this regard is Buytendijk’s idea that play is most widespread among those animals in which the capture of differentiated objects is the main way of obtaining food. But these are precisely those groups of animals in which, due to the complexity of their living conditions, orientation activity is especially developed.

Thus, if we are to be consistent, we must admit that the basic life drives, which F. Buytendijk points out as underlying the game, are inherent not only in carnivores and monkeys, but also in other animals.

There is also no doubt that the dynamics of a young organism are characteristic not only of those animals that have play, but also of all others (chickens and calves as well as kittens, puppies and tiger cubs). From here the inevitable conclusion follows that it is not the basic life drives and not the special features of the dynamics of young organisms that are decisive for the game. Both of them can exist and act together, but there may not be a game.

In this case, we can only assume that the basis of the game is a special “testing” reaction to an object or, as we would say, an indicative reaction to something new in the conditions surrounding the young animal, and since for the young animal everything is new at first, it is simply an indicative reflex.

There is every reason to believe that there is an inversely proportional relationship between the degree of fixation and stereotyping of instinctive forms of behavior and the level of development of indicative reactions: the more fixed at the time of birth the stereotypical instinctive forms of behavior associated with the satisfaction of the basic needs of the animal, the less indicative reactions are manifested, and on the contrary, the less stereotypical forms of instinctive behavior are fixed at the time of birth, the stronger the manifestations of indicative reactions.

This relationship naturally arose during the phylogenetic development of animals. It was determined by the degree of complexity and variability of conditions to which the animal must adapt. On the contrary, there is a direct relationship between the degree of complexity and variability of conditions, on the one hand, and the degree of development of orienting reactions, on the other. That is why “hunters” and monkeys are animals with pronounced and developed indicative reactions, and in childhood they are “playing” animals.

It would be more correct to even speak, as P. Ya. Galperin rightly pointed out, about “orienting activity.” “The orientation reflex,” writes P. Ya. Galperin, “is a system of physiological components of orientation; turning to a new stimulus and adjusting the senses to better perceive it; to this we can add various vegetative changes in the body that promote or accompany this reflex. In short, the orientation reflex is a purely physiological process.

Another thing is indicative research activity, studying the situation, what Pavlov called “reflex what is it.” This research activity in the external environment lies beyond the boundaries of physiology. Essentially, indicative research activity coincides with what we simply call indicative activity. But adding “research” to “orientation” (which does not interfere at all in Pavlov’s experiments) becomes a hindrance for us, because orientation is not limited to research, cognitive activity, but research activity can grow into an independent activity, which itself needs orientation.

Even in animals, orientation is not limited to exploring the situation; followed by her assessment various objects(according to their significance for the actual needs of the animal), clarification through possible movement, trying on one’s actions to the intended objects and, finally, controlling the execution of these actions. All this is included in the orienting activity, but goes beyond the boundaries of research in the proper sense of the word” (1976, pp. 90-91). So, the game theory created by Buytendijk contains contradictions. As analysis shows, the appearance of orienting activity at a certain stage of animal development is completely sufficient to explain the emergence of play and all its phenomena, so described in detail by Buytendijk. What for Buytendijk was only one of the conditions for the manifestation of vital drives, in fact forms the basis for the construction of a general theory of animal play.

We also cannot agree with Buytendijk that the basis of play with an object is always the image or figurativeness of the object. In reality, at least in the initial forms of play, the thing with which the animal plays cannot represent any other object for the simple reason that the animal has not yet come into real contact with those objects that will serve to satisfy its basic needs in adulthood. Neither a ball of thread, nor a ball, nor a rustling and moving piece of paper can serve as images of a mouse for a kitten, simply because the young animal has not yet dealt with the latter. For an animal just beginning its life, everything is new. The new becomes familiar only through individual experience.

Buytendijk’s thoughts about limiting play are correct: excluding from the range of gaming phenomena simple repeated movements characteristic of the most early periods development of the child and some animals. Therefore, a series of repeated movements, which, according to S. Bühler, are games, since they are supposedly accompanied by functional pleasure, are in reality not games. Buytendijk's position that they only play with objects should be understood in the sense that play is behavior and, therefore, a certain relationship to the environment, to the objective conditions of existence.

F. Buytendijk objects to the preventive function of the game, as it is presented by K. Groos. And indeed, exercise is possible only in relation to something that has arisen in the mind in behavior. At the same time, he places a high value on the developmental significance of the game, and this is true. The game is not an exercise, but a development. New things appear in it, it is the path to establishing new forms of organization of behavior necessary in connection with the complication of living conditions. Here Groos's thought about the meaning of play is renewed and deepened.

Finally, it should be noted that after Freud, the tendencies of “depth” psychology, that is, psychology trying to introduce all the features of behavior and all the higher manifestations of the dynamics of primary biological drives, began to appear more and more sharply. K. Bühler, and behind him F. Buytendijk - typical representatives such “deep” psychology.

It is paradoxical that, accepting the need for development in everything, “deep” psychologists make an exception for drives that have no history, always remaining the same. According to this logic, no matter how behavior changes during the transition from animals to humans, from primitive forms to the highest manifestations of human creative genius, it always remains the same manifestation of primary, unchanging, ultimately unknowable drives.

In this regard, one cannot but agree with the remark of A. N. Leontyev, who writes: “The naturalistic approach not only leads to the impossibility of scientifically explaining the actual specifics of human activity and his consciousness, but retrospectively reinforces false ideas in biology. Returning to the animal world from human behavior, the features of which appear in this approach as fundamentally unrevealable, inevitably reinforces in biology the idea of ​​​​the existence of an unknowable principle. This approach supports in the theory of evolution - now, as if from above - metaphysical, idealistic concepts that postulate either the mysterious - “instinctive” movement of neuron processes or the existence of entelechy, or the universal tendency towards “good form” or deep, eternally operating drives, etc. » (1965, p. 341).

We dwelled in such detail on Buytendijk’s theory of play for two reasons: firstly, because in Buytendijk’s work false metaphysical and idealistic ideas were intricately intertwined with correct remarks and provisions, and the isolation of these latter seemed important; secondly, because Buytendijk’s game theory is the most significant general theory of the game, the pinnacle of Western European thought on this issue.

It appears that this theory has not been sufficiently appreciated. Buytendijk's idea that they play only with objects, and only with objects that are partially familiar, did not become the goal of the study, and the necessary conclusions were not drawn from it. Of course, Buytendijk himself is to blame for this, as he highlighted the initial drives and dynamics of the young organism, but the point of scientific criticism is not only a negative assessment, but also to identify what should be taken into account in the further development of the problem.

After Buytendijk, a crisis arose in the creation of a general theory of the game, which ultimately led to the denial of the very possibility of creating such a theory.

J. Kollarits (1940) in his critical article pointed out that, despite the work of Claparède, Groos, Buytendijk and other authors, there is still no unity in understanding the nature of the game, and this is primarily because psychologists Different contents are put into the same term. The author examines the most varied criteria of play (exercise, pleasure, rest, liberation, community with space, repetition, youthful dynamics, fiction, i.e. the main features put forward by Groos, Buytendijk, Claparède) and shows that, firstly, are not found in all games and, secondly, they are also found in non-game activities. As a result, he comes to the conclusion that it is fundamentally impossible to accurately identify the game. There is simply no such special activity, and what is called play is nothing more than the same activity of an adult creature of a given species and sex, but only limited to a certain stage of development of instincts, mental structure, anatomy nervous system, muscles, internal organs and, in particular, endocrine glands. (The author does not notice that he himself proposes a certain theory of the game. How correct it is is another matter. It seems to us that it is close to the views of V. Stern, who considered the game “the dawn of a serious instinct.”)

An even more sharply negative position regarding play as a special activity is expressed in an article by X. Schlosberg (N. Schlosberg, 1947). The author, a prominent representative of American behaviorism, criticizing various theories of play, comes to the conclusion that the category of play activity is so vague that it is almost useless for modern psychology.

These are, in general, rather disappointing results of half a century of attempts to create a general theory of the game. This does not mean that play as a special form of behavior characteristic of childhood does not exist; this only means that within the framework of those biological and psychological concepts from which the authors of game theories proceeded, such a theory could not be created.

If we analyze the signs by which play was distinguished from other types of behavior, then the general approach to their isolation can be called phenomenological, that is, paying attention to external phenomena that sometimes accompany this type of behavior, but not revealing its objective essence. In this we see the main drawback of the approach to studying the game, which led to negative conclusions.

In addition, characteristic of these theories was the identification of the course of a child’s mental development, and thereby his play, with the development of young animals and their games. But such a general theory of play, covering the play of young animals and the play of a child, due to the profound qualitative difference in their mental development, cannot be created at all. This does not mean, however, that two separate theories cannot be created: the theory of animal play and the theory of child play. Here it is appropriate to express some thoughts about the psychological nature of the play of young animals, which arose during the analysis of the materials we have. Perhaps these assumptions will be taken into account by the creators of such a theory. In addition, they are important for our purposes, as they can help identify the specific features of children’s play.

The game can be, and in fact is, the subject of study of various sciences, for example biology, physiology, etc. It is also the subject of study of psychology, and primarily of that branch of psychology that deals with problems of mental development. A psychologist who studies these problems is interested in play primarily as an activity in which a special type of mental regulation and behavior control is carried out.

There is no doubt that play as a special form of behavior appears only at a certain stage in the evolution of the animal world and its appearance is associated with the emergence of childhood as a special period of individual development. Groos and especially Buytendijk rightly emphasize this evolutionary aspect of the origin of play.

Let us take as starting points some of Buytendijk’s propositions. Let us assume that only young carnivorous mammals (predators) and monkeys play; Let us also accept that play is not a function of the body, but a form of behavior, that is, activity with things, and, moreover, with things that have elements of novelty. In order to establish what biological meaning activity with such objects may have in the young of these animal species, let us find out at what level the mental regulation of the behavior of adult individuals is located.

According to A. N. Leontiev (1965), animals of these species are at different stages of development of the perceptual psyche, and higher species- at the stage of intelligence. Mental control of behavior at the stage of the perceptual psyche consists in the fact that the animal identifies in the surrounding reality the conditions in which an object is objectively given that directly stimulates its activity and can satisfy a biological need, and at the stage of intelligence it also highlights the relationships between things that make up the conditions for the implementation of activity . Characteristic for the organization of behavior last type is the emergence of preparatory phases in it.

Such elements of activity as avoiding obstacles, lying in wait for prey, pursuing with overcoming obstacles and taking detours are aimed not at the object of need itself, but at the conditions in which it is given. These elements of behavior are controlled by the mental reflection of conditions, their images. The main thing here is not that the animal perceives an obstacle standing in the way of achieving the goal, but that an orientation appears on the relationship between the object and other conditions. Orientation leads to the fact that in the movement directed towards these conditions, the path to the final object is already seen.

As P. Ya. Galperin rightly notes, “the significance of Köhler’s experiments (and all experiments constructed according to this type) also lies in the fact that they show very simple situations, which, however, cannot be solved by “random trial and error” - without orienting the animal to the essential relations of the task. In them, the process of orientation acts as a prerequisite for successful behavior. After these situations, it becomes even clearer that in tasks that are solved through random trials, orientation is also necessary, at least minimally, on the relationship of action to a successful result.” “Orientation of behavior on the basis of the image of the environment and the action itself (or at least its path to the final object), continues P. Ya. Galperin, constitutes a necessary condition (constant, not isolated and random) for the success of the action” (1966, p. 245).

This is an essential psychological characteristic of the activity of animals at this stage of evolutionary development.

It must be especially emphasized that for the success of an action, not just orientation is required, but quick and accurate orientation, brought to perfection and acquiring an almost automatic character. In the struggle for existence, any delay or inaccuracy is “like death.”

Is it possible to imagine that such an organization of actions arises in the course of individual adaptation, in the implementation of activities directly related to the struggle for existence? No, the development of such an organization could not follow this path. This would very quickly lead to the fact that animals would die out of hunger or die from enemies.

Consequently, a special period had to arise in the individual life of animals and special activity during this period, in which the necessary organization of any subsequent activity directly aimed at the struggle for the existence and preservation of the species would develop and improve.

J. Bruner (1972) emphasized that the nature of childhood and the methods and forms of education evolve and are subject to the same natural selection as any other morphological or behavioral form. One of the hypotheses regarding the evolution of primates, writes Bruner, is the assumption that this evolution is based on progressive selection of a very specific structure of childhood. This assumption seems close to the truth and applies not only to the evolution of primates, but also to the evolution of all species of animals living in an objectively dissected environment, requiring adaptation of behavior to individually unique conditions in which the object of need may appear. It is precisely because of the uniqueness of these conditions that, as P. Ya. Galperin showed, there arises an objective need for mental regulation of actions, i.e., regulation based on the image of the situation, the conditions of action. Stereotyping is impossible here, but maximum variability of actions is required.

The inclusion of childhood as a special period of life in the general chain of the evolutionary process is an important step towards understanding its nature.

Embryologists have long since taken this step. In Russian science, this step was taken by A. N. Severtsev. I. I. Shmalgauzen, developing the ideas of A. N Severtsev, wrote: “The progressive complication of the organization of an adult animal is accompanied by a complication of the processes of individual development, as a result of which this organization is created” (1969, p. 353). Summarizing the materials available in embryology, Schmalhausen emphasizes: “Ontogenesis is not only the result of phylogeny, but also its basis. Ontogenesis is not only lengthened by adding stages: it is completely rebuilt in the process of evolution; it has its own history, naturally connected with the history of the adult organism and partially determining it.

Phylogeny cannot be considered as the history of only an adult organism and cannot be contrasted with ontogeny. Phylogeny is the historical series of known (selected) ontogenies” (ibid., pp. 351-352).

These important provisions relate not only to the embryonic development of morphological forms, but also to the postembryonic development of behavioral forms. Characterizing the organization of behavior of animals that, according to the terminology of A. N. Leontiev, are at the stage of development of the perceptual psyche, we pointed out the obligatory presence in such behavior of orienting activity, which can take place in various forms - preceding behavior or accompanying it.

The emergence of orienting activity in itself does not lead to the emergence of new forms of behavior.

P. Ya. Galperin, to whom we owe the development of the theory of orienting activity, writes in the work already cited: “The participation of orienting activity in the adaptation of an animal to the individual characteristics of the environment does not necessarily mean the emergence of some new forms of behavior. On the contrary, first of all, it opens up the possibility of a much more flexible, and therefore wider, use of the existing motor repertoire. And this is an extremely important circumstance - orientation in terms of image allows you not to create new forms of behavior for extremely changeable individual situations, but to use general patterns of behavior, each time adapting them to individual variants of the situation. And this also means that the presence of mental regulation of behavior is evidenced not by the emergence of special, new forms of behavior, but by the special flexibility, variability and diversity of their application” (1976, p. 117).

We have already indicated that orientational activity and perfect regulation of behavior on its basis must take shape before the animal begins an independent struggle for existence, that is, in childhood. The game is the activity in which behavior management is developed and improved on the basis of indicative activity. We emphasize: not any specific form of behavior - food, defensive, sexual, but quick and accurate mental control of any of them. That is why the game seems to mix all possible forms of behavior into a single ball, and that is why game actions are incomplete4.

Widespread studies of animal behavior in natural conditions in recent decades, as well as special experimental studies, have led to the identification of new types of behavior. Of interest to us is the identification of special research behavior. R. Hind, summarizing the available materials, considers it appropriate to distinguish between an orienting reaction, which is associated with immobility, and active research, in which the animal moves relative to the object or area being examined. Hynd describes exploratory behavior as behavior that familiarizes an animal with its environment or source of stimulation. However, he points out the need to distinguish between exploratory behavior and play: “Although some types of play behavior also contribute to familiarization with the subject, exploration and play should not be equated. If the subject is unfamiliar, then exploratory behavior may precede play behavior and weaken as one becomes familiar with it” (1975, p. 377).

The distinction between exploratory and play behavior is important because very often the first turns into the second. Thus, there is every reason to distinguish the orienting reaction, exploratory behavior and play. It can be assumed that in this order these forms arose during evolution and arise in the ontogenesis of the behavior of young animals.

This assumption is confirmed by data on the ontogeny of the forms of behavior of higher mammals. K. E. Fabry (1976), based on a generalization of numerous materials, attributes play as a special form of behavior of young animals to the period immediately preceding puberty.

At a very preliminary level, we could describe the play of young animals as an activity in which the animal, manipulating an object (thing), creates unique and unforeseen variations in its position with its movements and continuously acts with the thing, focusing on the features of these rapidly changing situations. The main ones? The signs of play under this assumption are rapidly changing situations in which the object finds itself after each action with it, and the equally rapid adaptation of actions, their control based on orientation in the features of each time a new situation.

The central core of such activity is orientation in a rapidly and continuously changing situation and control of motor acts on this basis. A specific feature of the movements in the game is their incompleteness, the absence of an executive element in them. The kitten scratches, but does not tear the object, and the puppy bites, but does not bite through it. This created the illusion among some psychologists that there was fiction or fantasy in animal play.

Fragmentary observations of animal play provide some basis for assumptions about the path of development of play during the individual life of animals. It develops from activity with a maximally expanded orienting part and an unfinished, collapsed, inhibited executive part to activity with a maximally collapsed, instantaneous and accurate orienting part. This convolution, instantaneousness and precision of orientation, being included in “serious” activities that carry out the struggle for existence, creates the illusion of a complete absence of mental regulation in it. Therefore, the play of young animals is an exercise, but not an exercise of a separate motor system or a separate instinct and type of behavior, but an exercise in the quick and accurate control of motor behavior in any of its forms, based on images of the individual conditions in which the object is located, i.e. exercise in orientation activities.

The identification of an indicative phase in the behavior of higher animals should have affected the structure of their nervous system and the sequence of maturation of its various parts. We did not specifically analyze differences in the sequence of maturation of individual parts of the nervous system during the transition from “non-playing” animals to “playing” ones. There are direct indications of a significant restructuring of the order of maturation of individual parts of the nervous system during the transition from animals to humans. N.M. Shchelovanov, in a comparative study of early ontogenesis, established that “in the very course of the development of a baby’s movements, from the moment of birth, features are noted that sharply distinguish him from young animals and are of great importance for education. Thus, we have established that in infants the relationship between the time of development of perceptive organs and movements is different than in animals. Already in the second month, the baby’s cerebral cortex begins to function, as evidenced by the formation of conditioned reflexes from all perceptive organs, including the visual and auditory. At the same time, the movements of a two-month-old baby are still extremely imperfect. The sequence in the development of movements and perceptive organs is different in most animals. Their movements are either already organized at the time of birth, or are formed before any conditioned reflexes can be formed from higher perceptive organs or analyzers, i.e., the eye or ear. Thus, the baby first develops higher analyzers, visual and auditory, up to their cortical sections, and only after that movements begin to develop. In most animals the reverse order is observed” (1935, p. 64).

Thus, in the cubs of higher animals, the entire motor system is almost ready at the time of birth, while the system of higher analyzers is not yet ready. The system of higher analyzers is the system through which orienting activity is carried out, the formation of images of objects and conditions that regulate behavior. Therefore, there is enough reason to assume that the cubs of these animals have mental regulation—orientation of behavior—that is not ready at the time of birth. The discrepancy in the development of motor systems and their mental control was formed during biological evolution.

The childhood of the cubs of these species of animals proceeds in conditions where adults provide the satisfaction of basic needs and the cubs, due to physical immaturity and lack of formation of mental regulation of behavior, do not carry out activities to obtain food.

On this basis, a special activity arises, within which the development of processes occurs that form the basis for the mental regulation of behavior. This activity is the play of animals. The elements of novelty in objects that Buytendijk points out are necessary, since, on the one hand, they support orienting activity, on the other hand, during manipulation they continuously change, requiring mental regulation of behavior. The identification of orienting processes on the basis of corresponding changes in the environment with the construction of special activities not directly related to the satisfaction of basic needs is the most important fact in the evolution of forms of behavior. Childhood in higher animals, from this point of view, is a period of formation of mental regulation of behavior and, on this basis, the elimination of the discrepancy between the formation of the basic motor systems and the immaturity of higher analytical systems. The activity within which the development and improvement of mental regulation occurs is the game as an orienting activity isolated in its essential content.

All these points we have made, summarizing the accumulated but not systematized experience, must be tested in special comparative psychological studies.

As we have already indicated, referring to the research data of N.M. Shchelovanova, the order of development of motor and higher analytical systems in a child is fundamentally different than in animals. This gives reason to assume that the reasons and mechanisms for the emergence of play in a child will be significantly different.

It must be emphasized that in deducing our theses we proceeded from a theoretical understanding of the regulatory function of the psyche for behavior and the lifetime formation of this function in higher animals.

In the theories of play that we presented and analyzed, the problem of mental development, that is, the development of the orienting function of the psyche, was not raised at all. Perhaps this is precisely why a general psychological theory of play could not be created.

We are far from thinking that we have succeeded in constructing a complete theory of animal play. However, we hope that the above considerations will prompt psychologists studying animal play to new approach. We agree with the thought of R. Hinde that “the discovery of the principles of play behavior will undoubtedly in itself reward researchers for all their labors, not to mention the fact that it will shed light on the nature of the regulation of many other types of activities” (1975, p. 386).

Theories of the origin of the game

Attempts to unravel the mystery of the origin of the game have been made by scientists for many hundreds of years.

The problem of the game arose as a component of the problem of free time and leisure of people due to trends in the religious, socio-economic and cultural development of society.

Art, like play, has as its content the norms of human life and activity, but also meaning and motives.

Art consists in interpreting these aspects of human life using special means of artistic form, telling people about them, making them experience these problems, accepting or rejecting the artist’s understanding of the meaning of life.

It is this relationship between play and art that explains the gradual displacement of expanded forms of play activity from the lives of adult members of society by various forms of art.

The beginning of the development of a general theory of the game should be attributed to the works of Shiller and Spencer. Significant contributions to the development of this theory were made by Freud, Piaget, Stern, Dewey, Fromm, Huizinga and others.

In Russian psychology and pedagogy, game theory was developed by K.D. Ushinsky, P.P. Blonsky, G.V. Plekhanov, S.L. Rubinstein, L.S. Vygotsky, N.K. Krupskaya, A.N. Leontyev, D.B. Elkonin, B.C. Mukhina, A.S. Makarenko and others.

A.N. Leontyev in the work “Psychological Foundations of Preschool Play” describes the process of the emergence of children’s role-playing play as follows: “in the course of a child’s activity, a contradiction arises between the rapid development of his need to act with objects, on the one hand, and the development of operations that carry out these actions (i.e. methods of action) - on the other. The child wants to drive a car himself, he wants to row a boat, but cannot carry out this action... because he does not master and cannot master those operations that are required by the real objective conditions of this action... This contradiction can be resolved by child in only one single type of activity, namely in play activity, in play..."

Only in a game action can the required operations be replaced by other operations, and its objective conditions by other objective conditions, while the content of the action itself is preserved.

Here are some basic approaches to explaining the reasons for the emergence of the game:

The theory of excess nervous forces, compensatory nature, arose in the 19th century, at a time when the prevailing point of view was that play is a phenomenon that replaces, compensates for activity. The founder of this theory is the English philosopher Spencer(1820 - 1903), who considered play to be the result of excessive activity, the possibilities of which cannot be exhausted in ordinary activities. According to Spencer, play is significant only in that it allows one to release the excess energy inherent in animals with high level organization and person. Spencer argues that the games of people, including children, are a manifestation of instincts aimed at success in the “struggle for existence,” generate “ideal satisfaction” of these instincts and are performed for the sake of this satisfaction. Spencer, puts the problem of excess strength in a broader evolutionary biological context. The higher an animal is on the evolutionary ladder, the more free energy it has, which is spent not on the immediate needs of the body, but on imaginary activities, which include games and art.

Theory of instinctivity, functions of exercise in the game, prevention of instincts. At the beginning of the 19th century, the prevention theory of the Swiss scientist gained particular popularity. K. Gross, who considered the game to be primary, primordial, no matter what external or internal factors it is caused by: excess strength, fatigue, desire for competition, imitation, etc. The game, according to Gross, is an eternal school of behavior.

Gross took the same position of strengthening the development of hereditary forms of behavior in games, and was critical of the theories of rest and excess nervous forces. The essence of Gross's concept comes down to the denial of the reflex nature and the recognition of the spontaneity of development due to the discharge of internal energy in the body, that is, only instincts are exercised in the game.

His books are devoted to human games and animal games. For the first time, a large amount of specific material was generalized and systematized, and the problem of the biological essence and meaning of the game was posed. He was the first to raise the question of the importance of play for the entire course of a child’s mental development.

K. Gross believed that play occurs only in animals that do not have ready-made instinctive forms of behavior at the time of birth.

Spencer introduced an evolutionary approach to the understanding of play, pointing out the spread of games in animals whose instinctive forms are insufficient to adapt to changing conditions of existence. In the games of animals, preliminary adaptation occurs - the prevention of instincts to the conditions of the struggle for existence as they grow up.

Buytendijk came up with a new concept of the game in his book “The Game of Man and Animals.” Of great interest is the analysis of the characteristics of the relationship of this species of animal to the environment. Bonteidijk divides all mammals into herbivores and carnivores.

Carnivores are natural hunters and among them the game is most widespread.

Herbivores play very little or not at all. The exception is monkeys, since the form of obtaining food is grasping.

It must be admitted that the drives, that is, the instincts underlying the game, are also characteristic of people. The more fixed the instinctive forms of behavior are at the time of birth, the less developed the indicative forms of activity. But these biological theories do not take into account the historical study of the origins of children's play.

The theory of recapitulation and anticipation. American psychologist, teacher G.S. Hall(1846-1924) put forward the idea of ​​recapitulation (an abbreviated repetition of the stages of human development) in children's games.

The game, according to supporters of this theory, helps to overcome the instincts of the past and become more civilized. These researchers perceive the game and game paraphernalia as a reduced activity, i.e. as a reproduction of a way of life, cult ceremonies of distant ancestors.

There is also a theory of anticipation of the future in children's play. Proponents of this theory believe that the games of boys and girls are different, as they are determined by the life role that awaits them. Temporary aspects of gaming activity were dealt with by O.S. . Gazman. He wrote: “The game always appears simultaneously, as it were, in two time dimensions - in the present and the future.” Adherents of this theory are trying to prove that games, on the one hand, anticipate the future, but work for the present.

The theory of functional pleasure, the realization of innate drives, is actually a theory of psychoanalysis. The authors of this theory believe that the hidden desires of the unconscious sphere in games have a predominantly erotic connotation and are most often found in role playing games. A. Adler(1870 - 1937) - Austrian psychiatrist and psychologist, student of 3. Freud, the founder of individual psychology, considered the source of motivation to be the child’s desire for self-affirmation as compensation for the feeling of inferiority that arises in childhood. Adler explains the appearance of the game and its originality as the realization of desires that the child cannot fulfill in reality.

Freud- the founder of psychoanalysis, developed the idea of ​​compensatory play, connecting it with the unconscious mechanisms of the human psyche. According to Freud, unconscious drives are realized symbolically in children's games. Games, according to Freud's research data, cleanse and heal the psyche, relieve traumatic situations that are the cause of many neurological diseases. THAT. Children's play is one of the mechanisms for the release of forbidden drives.

According to Freud, in contrast to the hypothesis of game anticipation, games act not as an expression of a function, but as its image. The usefulness of play, according to Freud's theory, is to evoke genuine catharsis through gratification obtained in a roundabout way. Games allow the libido to unfold and express itself, to release sensuality that seeks to experience and know itself.

Play as a means of maintaining vigor and strength was interpreted by Schiller and Spencer. For Schiller, play is an aesthetic activity; an excess of forces free from the influence of needs is a condition for the emergence of aesthetic pleasure, which is delivered by the game. Schiller, G. Spencer, W. Wundt - according to their views, the origin of play is closely connected with the origin of art. Play, like art, is caused by an excess of vitality. And V. Wundt gave the following statement: “play is the child of labor.” Understanding that in the game a person not only spends, but also restores energy. Researchers such as Schaler, Wallon, Patrick, Steinthal considered the game not so much compensatory as balanced, and therefore relaxing. The game allows you to engage previously inactive organs and thereby restore vital balance.

The theory of a child’s spiritual development in play. K.D . Ushinsky(1824 - 1871) contrasts the preaching of the spontaneity of play activity with the idea of ​​using play in the general system of education, in preparing the child through play for work. Ushinsky was one of the first to argue that play combines aspiration, feeling and imagination at the same time.

Many scientists, including Piaget, Levin, Vygotsky, Elkonin, Ushinsky, Makarenko, Sukhomlinsky, believed that play arises in the light of spirituality and serves as a source of spiritual development of the child.

Undoubtedly, there are other versions of the origin of the game. For example, J. Chateau believes that children's games arose from their eternal desire to imitate adults. R. Hartley, JI. Frank, R. Goldenson suggest that play is generated by the “collective instinct” of children. The same Huizinga or Hesse, Lem, Mazaev consider culture to be the source of play, as well as play, the source of culture. Many of the above-mentioned researchers call the source of the game public reason.

The theory of the game in the aspect of its historical manifestation, clarification of its social nature, internal structure and its significance for the development of the individual in our country was developed by L.S. Vygotsky, A.N. Leontyev, D.B. Elkonin and others.

The same circle of researchers cite different sources and reasons for the emergence of the game phenomenon, considering various functions or related cultural phenomena.

The essence of the game is that it serves as preparation for serious further activities. In the game, the little man improves his abilities. The main strength of this theory is that it links play to development. Play, from Gross’s point of view, is the activity in which the formation of the necessary superstructure over innate reactions occurs, “acquired skills are formed - and, above all, new habitual reactions.”

Karl Gross defines the main ideas of “game theory” in the following provisions:

1) Any living being has inherited predispositions that give expediency to its behavior. In higher animals, the innate characteristics of their nature include an impulsive desire for activity, which manifests itself with particular force during the period of growth. In humans, innate reactions, no matter how necessary they may be, are insufficient to perform complex life tasks.

2) In the life of a supreme being there is childhood - a period of development and growth when it cannot independently support its life. This opportunity is given to him through parental care, which, in turn, is based on innate predispositions.

3) During childhood, a creature has the opportunity to acquire adaptations necessary for life, which do not develop directly from innate reactions; Therefore, a person is given a particularly long childhood - after all, the more perfect the work, the longer the preparation for it.

4) The most important and most natural way of developing adaptations is that inherited reactions themselves strive for manifestation and, thus, give rise to new acquisitions, so that acquired skills are formed above the innate basis - new habitual reactions.

5) A person has an innate desire to imitate, thanks to which a person adopts the habits and abilities of the older generation.

6) Where the developing individual, without any external purpose, manifests, strengthens and develops his inclinations, we are dealing with the original phenomena of play.

Summarizing his reasoning about the meaning of play, Gross writes: “If the development of adaptations for further life tasks is the main goal of our childhood, then play has a prominent place in this purposeful connection of phenomena, so that we can well say, using a somewhat paradoxical form, that we play not because we are children, but this is precisely why childhood was given to us, so that we can play.”

Karl Gross, like many other philosophers, psychologists and educators after him, did not solve the riddle of play, but his greatest merit is that he gave play the status of an activity that is most important for all development in childhood. Gross did not place play at the center of mental development; he simply stated that play has a biological meaning - a warning for future serious activities of an adult.

The ideas of K. Gross are very much developed today in theory and practice game-based learning Maria Montessori. The basis of children's game learning are various motives: communication motives (by solving game problems together, children learn to communicate with each other), cognitive motives (the game has a close result, stimulating the child to achieve a goal and understand the path to achieving the goal), motives for achieving success (situation success creates a favorable emotional background, and failure is not perceived in the game as a personal defeat and stimulates cognitive activity - revenge).

Questions for the MDK exam. 02.01.

Theoretical and methodological foundations for organizing play activities for children of early and preschool age.

Historical origin gaming activity.

The first games appeared long before the emergence of humans among animals. They are most advanced among monkeys - they use not only games associated with certain rituals (during the mating season, for example), but also those that are similar to similar games in people. People have had games since prehistoric times - starting with ritual ones (for example, rites), with the development of civilization, games became more and more complex and became almost any subject. A game is a set of meaningful actions united by a unity of motive. It is an expression of a certain attitude of the individual to the surrounding reality. The game of an individual is always closely connected with the activity on which the existence of a given species is based. In animals it is associated with the basic forms of instinctive life activity through which their existence is maintained; For a person, play is a “child of labor” (W. Wundt). A person’s game is a product of activity through which a person transforms reality and changes the world. The essence of human play is the ability to reflect and transform reality. In play, the child’s need to influence the world is first formed and manifested. This is the main, central and most general meaning of the game.

Children's games uniquely reflected the system of social relations of ancient society. Many of them were of a political nature: games of “king”, “playing judge”.

Differences in the way of life, traditions and culture of peoples inevitably bring a certain and quite pronounced shade to the games of their children. The British, isolated by the island position of their country, invented group games– football, basketball, rugby. These games are still part of the program today. physical education the younger generation.

In the life of the Russian people, various kinds of games and merrymaking have occupied a very prominent place since ancient times. In Rus', games were called such different and, at first glance, distant in nature phenomena as dances, dances, walking with songs, round dances, outdoor games, etc. Children were enthusiastic spectators of such games and, as they grew up, they became involved in traditional festive games. adult culture. Traditional games were a strong educational tool in the life of the people. They taught children the strict order of life and economic cycles, vividly and vividly revealed the world of adults to children, and contributed to the formation of a worldview and national self-awareness.

But there is another concept of play - in the sense of children's fun with a toy in the house, in society with brothers and sisters, peers, parents. Toys were made by adults, and games were given a special “heavenly” place - on the floors (board flooring next to the stove).

Seasonal and climatic conditions leave a clear imprint on the nature and direction of children's games. The games of peoples living in southern and northern countries differ quite significantly. Besides, summer games They are mobile in nature, winter ones, as a rule, take place indoors and represent dramatic or mental actions, notes V.N. Vsevolodsky-Gengross (1933). There are also certain differences between the games of boys and girls.

At the same time, in children's games different countries There are extremely many similarities both in style and in plot.

Thus, being in close connection with socio-economic level of development of society and cultural traditions of the people, the game evolves along with society. They leave a serious imprint on it and features of historical eras, and the dominant pedagogical views on the goals, content and methods of educating the younger generation. Any game, finding itself in some conditions, develops, and in others it transforms, and in others it simply ceases to exist.

Game theories in foreign and domestic psychology and pedagogy.

In Russian science, the first description and theory of the game were presented by A.N. Sikorsky, Russian psychiatrist and psychologist. He viewed the game as mental work in which the child learns about the world around him. Thus, there was a departure from the biologizing tendencies that were inherent in Western theories.

Rich factual material on the description of children's games was collected and published by E.A. Pokrovsky. He noted that the content of children's games reflects the activities of their parents: where the main activity of parents is hunting, children with toy guns and sticks hunt for animals. Girls are given toy utensils to prepare them for housekeeping. In this way, play prepares children for work.

P.F. paid considerable attention to the game. Lesgaft. He believed that children's games are mainly imitative in nature and, accordingly, cannot be the same among different peoples, in different families, classes, and localities. Children in games convey what surrounds them, what they observe, what causes the greatest impression. Consequently, the content of children's games is the surrounding reality.

A significant contribution to the development of game theory was made by K.D. Ushinsky. His study “Man as a Subject of Education” was published almost 30 years before the first works of K. Groos appeared. In it, he showed the importance of children's games for the development of mental functions (in particular, imagination), the formation of a child's personality, determined the place of play in children's lives, and the ways in which an adult influences children's games. According to K.D. Ushinsky’s game for a child is a feasible way to enter into the complex life around him. In their games, children reflect reality as they see it: “One girl’s doll cooks, sews, washes and irons; for another, he is lying on the sofa, receiving guests, rushing to the theater or to a reception; for the third, he beats people, starts a piggy bank, and counts money.”

A significant contribution to game theory was made by G.V. Plekhanov. He believed that in the history of society, work precedes play and determines its content. But in the life of an individual, play precedes work. It prepares children to enter adulthood.

Thus, psychological and pedagogical research has shown the inconsistency of the prevailing biological theories and proven the position that play arises under the influence of social conditions of life and upbringing.

Author	Name of theory	Essence	Minuses
Karl Gross Swiss scientist most popular	"instinct theory"	He considered the game as a preparation for life; the basis of the game are instincts, which are manifested and improved in it. Connects play with development and seeks its meaning in the role it plays in development. Karl Groos sees the meaning of the game in the interests of the future. He pays special attention to the fact that in the process of play a child uses precisely those forces that a person usually turns to during serious activity.	Explaining human games in the same way as animal games, one mistakenly reduces them entirely to a biological factor, to instinct. Revealing the significance of play for development, Gross's theory is essentially ahistorical. The main drawback is that this theory only indicates the “meaning” of the game, and not its source, and does not reveal the reasons that cause the game, the motives that motivate it.
Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller - German poet and philosopher	"excess strength"	He identified play with art and believed that play, like art, has common roots and arises when the vital primitive needs necessary for human existence are satisfied. And he spends excess energy on satisfying higher spiritual needs, which he finds in art and play.
Herbert Spencer English philosopher and sociologist	"compensatory theory"	Play is a means of getting rid of unrealized energy. The source of play is seen in an excess of strength: excess strength, not spent in life, in work, finds an outlet in the game.	Spencer's theory, firstly, refers only to the child. But the presence of a reserve of unspent forces cannot explain the direction in which they are spent, or why they pour out into the game, and not into some other activity; Moreover, a tired person also plays, turning to the game as a form of relaxation.
William Stern German psychologist	"the dawn of serious instinct"	Game, in his opinion, is an exercise of hereditary mechanisms of behavior. In the game, a person is completely reflected with all his tendencies - not only present, but also past. Therefore, play is indeed a preliminary exercise of our powers, as Groos proved, but at the same time, according to Stern, play is a preliminary test (Vortastung) of various possibilities of action so that in the end the most suitable forms are found.	The essence of Stern's theory is that he sees play as a manifestation of undeveloped, rudimentary functions and tendencies. Firstly, if this were so, the author should not have talked about the game of adults, but considered the game only a phenomenon of childhood. Secondly, the facts of the game are known, which cannot in any way be said to represent a manifestation of forces that are in their infancy.
Karl Ludwig Bühlermann psychologist and linguist	functional pleasure theory	The main motivation for games is the pleasure gained directly from the gameplay. (i.e. pleasure from the action itself, regardless of the result) as the main motive of the game.	loses sight of the real content of the action, which contains its true motive, reflected in one or another emotionally effective coloring. Recognizing functional pleasure, or pleasure from functioning, as the determining factor for play, this theory sees in play only a functional function of the organism.
Hall's theory American psychologist	"recapitulation theory"	Play is a mechanism by which a child moves from reproducing one of the stages of human development to another	Consequently, the game is rather an unconscious memory of the past - not one’s own, but a kind - and not a product of fantasy; it is rather a mnemonic process rather than a manifestation of fantasy. But the latter statement is at odds with the generally accepted view that the nature of the game is fantasy-like in nature.
Sigmund Freudian psychologist, psychiatrist and neurologist, Alfred Adler	Freudian, Adlerian	The game reveals the inferiority of a subject running away from life, unable to cope with it, with life. From being a manifestation of creative activity, the game turns into a dumping ground for what has been repressed from life; from a product and a factor of development, it becomes an expression of insufficiency and inferiority; from a preparation for life, it turns into an escape from it.
Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky Soviet psychologist		A child, while playing, creates an imaginary situation for himself instead of a real one and acts in it, freeing himself from situational attachment and performing a certain role, in accordance with the figurative meanings that he attaches to surrounding objects. At the same time, he does not consider pleasure to be the root cause of games, does not consider play to be the predominant type of activity of a child, but considers it an element of development (“the relationship of play to development should be compared with the relationship of learning to development” - according to the theory of the zone of proximal development)[	arbitrarily excludes those early forms of play in which the child does not create any imaginary situation. By excluding such early forms of play, this theory does not allow us to describe play as it developed.
Dmitry Nikolaevich UznadzeGeorgian Soviet psychologist and philosopher		The game satisfies the functional need to use developing functions that are not yet connected to real activities; this also determines the content of the game
L. Schaller, M. Lazarus, H. Steinthal, German psychologists	theory of “active recreation”,	In addition to the passive rest that we have in our sleep, we need active rest, other activities free from everything gloomy and painful that is associated with work. Fatigue from work requires not only psychophysical relaxation, but also mental and emotional rest, which can only be realized in activity, but this activity must develop in mental space.	The concept of play should cover both the play of children and the play of adults. Moreover, the functions of play in children and adults can be completely different.

Children's games for the entire period of the Soviet formation were not collected, not generalized, which means they were not classified. The famous psychologist A. N. Leontyev was right when he asserted: “... in order to approach the analysis of a child’s specific play activity, one must take the path not of a formal list of the games that he plays, but to penetrate into their actual psychology, into the meaning of the game for the child. Only then will the development of the game appear for us in its true inner content.”

The most common game theories in the 19th and 20th centuries:

K. Gross believed that play is the unconscious preparation of a young organism for life.

K. Schiller, G. Spencer explained the game as a simple waste of excess energy accumulated by the child. It is not spent on labor and therefore is expressed in play actions.

K. Büller emphasized the usual enthusiasm with which children play and argued that the whole meaning of the game lies in the pleasure that it gives the child.

S. Freud believed that a child is motivated to play by a feeling of his own inferiority.

Although the above explanations of the game seem to be different, all these authors argue that the basis of the game is the instinctive, biological needs of the child: his drives and desires.

Russian and Soviet scientists take a fundamentally different approach to explaining the game:

A. I. Sikorsky, P. F. Kapterev, P. F. Lesgat, K. D. Ushinsky speak out for the uniqueness of the game as a truly human activity.

N.K. Krupskaya, A.S. Makarenko, and then many teachers and psychologists deepened the analysis of the game and strictly scientifically explained this unique children's activity.